Crisis and the resurgence of emigration from Greece: trends, representations, and the
multiplicity of migrant trajectories1
Manolis Pratsinakis, Panos Hatziprokopiou, Dimitris Grammatikas, Lois Labrianidis
Cite as
Pratsinakis Manolis, Panos Hatziprokopiou, Dimitris Grammatikas and Lois Labrianidis 2017 “Crisis and the resurgence of
emigration from Greece: trends, representations, and the multiplicity of migrant trajectories” In European Mobility in Times of
Crisis. The New Context of European South-North Migration eds Glorius, B. and Domínguez-Mujica, Bielefeld: J. Transcript
Verlag.
Abstract
In the context and conjuncture of the crisis affecting the Eurozone as whole, yet shaking
mostly its “weakest links”, rising unemployment and steep decreases in salaries and welfare
allowances are cited as push factors contributing to what is seen as the emergence of a new
emigration wave from Southern Europe. This is especially true for Greece, the country which
has been hit hardest by the crisis, recession and austerity, and their social and political
consequences. In Greece, there is extended media coverage of this new emigration, which is
presented as an one-way option for certain population segments, notably the young and the
highly skilled, and hence a drain of the most dynamic part of the country’s labour force.
Despite this media attention, however, little is known about the current intensification of
emigration from Greece and its characteristics, as well as the experiences of the country’s new
“crisis migrants”.
This paper aims to partly fill in this gap. It begins by sketching the broad picture and
identifying key trends, before moving on to explore key issues in the emerging public
discourse. It then zooms into the case of recent Greek migrants to the Netherlands, providing
a typology of different mobility trajectories and migration experiences. Through this, we
intend to deconstruct a number of conventional assumptions. Firstly, by situating new Greek
emigration in a historical continuum, whereby its structural preconditions predated the crisis.
Secondly, by identifying the qualitative dimensions of rupture through which the intra-EU
mobility from Greece has undergone a shift from a career choice to one largely motivated by
necessity. Finally, by highlighting those aspects that problematize idealistic perceptions of life
1
The chapter partly draws from research conducted by the first author for the EUMIGRE project, funded by the
EU’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No
658694.
1
and work “in Europe” often depicted in Greek media, we bring to the fore the ambivalence of
mobility decisions and the multiplicity of individual pathways.
Key-words
Emigration; intra-EU mobility; Greece; crisis; migrant trajectories.
Introduction
In post-war decades Greece emerged as an emigration country and a net exporter of labour
(Fakiolas/King 1996). By the mid-1970s, net migration rates had turned positive primarily
due to the return of former Greek emigrants, especially from European destinations such as
(West) Germany. It is around the same period when recruitment of foreign labour was first
registered; from the 1980s Greece also begun to attract (limited numbers of) refugees and
international students, and, by the early 1990s, the country became a de facto destination for
international migrants. This turnaround coincided with similar pathways of other southern
European countries (King 2000). Since then, immigration has become a crucial factor of
societal change, largely monopolising public debates and academic research.
In the meanwhile, emigration had in fact never ceased as such, but remained insignificant as
compared to the inflows. A renewed public discussion has recently appeared, in which rising
unemployment and cuts in salaries and allowances, in the context of debt crisis, recession,
austerity and their socio-political consequences, are cited as push factors contributing to the
emergence of a new emigration wave. At an early phase, this discussion has largely been
shaped by a study of Greek professionals leaving in search of better career opportunities
abroad – a trend which has always been in place, but became more prominent since the 1990s
and intensified with the crisis (Labrianidis 2011; 2014). Outmigration receives increasing
media attention, and is presented as an one-way option for the young and the highly skilled,
and hence a drain of the most dynamic part of the country’s labour force.
Despite growing media coverage, however, still little is known about the current
intensification of emigration and its qualitative dimensions. Moreover, increasingly
politicised media discourses tend to overlook certain issues while others remain silenced. Not
only the pre-existing structural conditions tend to be forgotten, but also the diversification of
emigration flows is often ignored. A major shift that is underway concerns the transition from
2
emigration as a career choice to a pathway imposed by need. As such, it may affect primarily
the young and highly skilled, but spans to include other population segments: migrants,
minorities, people of older age and lower educational attainments. As ever, “objective”
structural factors (“the crisis”, etc.) are refined into a multiplicity of subjective motivations,
trajectories and experiences in destination places. Depending on conditions there and
prospects at home, as well as on the individuals’ or households’ circumstances and plans,
mobility pathways can be temporary or ambivalent.
Aiming to partly fill in such gaps and to account for neglected aspects, this chapter focuses on
the resurgence of Greek emigration at times of crisis by combining two different angles: the
view from the sending country, and that at the destination. It is divided in two broad sections,
each drawing on a variety of sources. In the first section, we overview the evidence deriving
from official statistics and academic studies on the topic in order to sketch the broad picture
of (what we know about) current emigration trends. We then explore media debates so as to
highlight key points in the emerging public discourse, based on a review of 60 original
newspaper items published between 2010-15. In the second section, we zoom into one of the
emerging destinations, the Netherlands. Building on qualitative research conducted in the
context of two research projects and on survey material deriving from engagement with a
Greek community organization2, we provide a typology of Greek “crisis” migration to this
country. The chapter closes with a concluding section, in which we revisit key findings and
summarise our arguments.
The resurgence of emigration from Greece
2
Most of the qualitative data presented in the second section were collected as part of Pratsinakis’
aforementioned EUMIGRE project. The chapter also builds on additional material from the recently completed
project "Outward Migration from Greece during the Crisis" (2015-16), funded by the National Bank of Greece
through the London School of Economics’ Hellenic Observatory (Research Tender 3-NBG3-2014; see
Labrianidis/Pratsinakis 2016). The Netherlands survey was conducted during 2013-14 by Grammatikas through
his involvement in the Greek community organization “Neoafihthendes” providing information and support to
newcomers in The Hague, Rotterdam and Amsterdam, in which Pratsinakis also volunteered. The first section
draws on collective work and on Hatziprokopiou’s review of media articles.
3
Even if the establishment of the right to free movement, employment and settlement across
the European Union (EU) for Greek citizens in the 1980s allowed for unrestricted mobility,
this never took the form of mass outflows. Until recently, Greeks were notably registered
among the least mobile Europeans. A 2005 Eurobarometer survey unveiled that Greeks
(second after the Cypriots) were the least favourable towards long distance mobility
(European Commission 2006). Another Eurobarometer, conducted in 2009, showed that only
eight per cent of Greeks envisaged working abroad (the lowest after Italians), while the share
of those who would consider working in some other country in case of unemployment was
well below the EU average (European Commission 2010). This was soon due to change in the
shadow of the crisis.
In this section we overview existing evidence on new emigration and explore aspects of the
emerging media discourse. The former relies on relevant academic studies and official data,
evincing key figures and trends. The latter draws from a collection of nearly 100 newspaper
(online and print) articles directly or indirectly accounting for the issue of outmigration from
Greece, published between 2010-2015. These were identified during two main rounds of
systematic Internet searches: one out of five during December 2013 – January 2014, and most
of the remainder during December 2015 – January 2016. Of these, we have selected 60
original items, which we reviewed with the aim to explore media discourses on new
emigration from Greece3.
Emigration trends
Albeit limited, emigration in the recent past was more frequent among specific groups:
emigrants of the post-war waves and their offspring moving between Greece and European
destinations (Fakiolas/King 1996), Muslims from the minority of Thrace spending spells of
employment in Germany or Turkey (Pratsinakis 2002), as well as increased number of
students abroad (Karamesini 2010). Above all, there has been a continuous outflow of
professionals that started becoming prominent in the 1990s, increasingly to Europe
(Labrianidis 2011). Yet, highly skilled migration was largely a matter of choice for the middle
and upper social classes; most emigrants left the country for reasons beyond employment as
3
We searched on Google, rather than excavating into specific media; and – for the analysis hereby presented –
we have limited ourselves to national and general news media, rather than local or specialised ones, and tried to
maintain some balance between original articles and news duplicated in several media.
4
such, subjectively justifying their choice as an “escape” from a parochial Greek society, and
as a desire to explore the world and live as cosmopolitans (Labrianidis 2011, 196-7).
Labrianidis’ (2011) pioneering study, based on an online survey conducted in 2009-10 that
generated a sample of 1821 individuals and plenty of qualitative information, revealed the
reality of “brain drain” as a trend predating the crisis, attributed not to the “over-education” of
the young (against conventional earlier assumptions), but rather to structural malfunctions of
the Greek productive model of the past decades, partly a (domestic) reason for the crisis.
Accordingly, the inability of the labour market to absorb graduates has been primarily due to
the private’s sector failure to invest in high added-value products and services and expand
knowledge-intensive sectors requiring highly skilled personnel (Labrianidis 2011; 2014). The
crisis seems to intensify such trends, as job opportunities shrink and public sector
employment is not a possibility anymore as a result of restrictions in new recruitments (ibid.;
Pelliccia 2013; Triandafyllidou/Gropas 2014).
Yet the crisis undermines the employment prospects not only for graduates, but for the entire
workforce. To give just an obvious example: the annual average unemployment rate in 2015
was nearly 25 per cent, almost double that of 2010 and more than triple than in 2008 (Figure
1); in the last quarter of 2015, nearly half of young people aged 20-24 were unemployed, and
over 37 per cent of those 25-29 years old. In a context of GDP contraction of more than one
quarter between 2008-14, the same period has also seen steep decreases in earnings and
welfare provisions and allowances. The combined effects of recession, extreme austerity, and
a generalised mistrust towards institutions and disillusionment from the political system have
changed drastically mobility intentions. Despite the previously recorded scepticism, many
were forced by the circumstances to change their views on mobility in a very short time span.
Figure 1. Emigration and unemployment rates, 2008-2014
5
130.000
120.000
110.000
100.000
90.000
80.000
70.000
60.000
50.000
40.000
30.000
20.000
10.000
0
30,0
25,0
20,0
15,0
10,0
5,0
0,0
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
est imat ed emigrat ion from Greece
immigrat ion of Greeks t o t he UK* *
immigrat ion of Greeks t o Germany*
mean yearly unemploym ent rat e
Sources: Hellenic Statistical Authority, Population and social conditions, Demography: Migration flows (200814), http://www.statistics.gr/en/statistics/-/publication/SPO15/-; Labour Market: Employment-Unemployment
(Timeseries) http://www.statistics.gr/en/statistics/-/publication/SJO01/-; *. Germany: DESTATIS, Bevölkerung;
Wanderungen: https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online; ** UK: Department for Work & Pensions,
database: NINo registrations: https://stat-xplore.dwp.gov.uk.
Even if actual emigration is not systematically recorded as such, official data evince that there
are already many who have taken that step. Figure 1 illustrates estimated numbers of
emigrants, released annually by the Greek Statistical Authority since 2008. Accordingly, over
half a million people left Greece in the period 2010-2014: emigration rates surged after 2009,
peaked in 2012 and since then appear to decline, yet the numbers leaving annually now well
exceed 100,000. Unpacking the composition of the outflows and the emigrants’ destinations,
however, is a complex matter in many respects.
First and foremost, significant shares of those leaving are foreign nationals4. Albanians, for
example, who constitute the majority of Greece’s immigrants and are severely affected by
rising unemployment, may take advantage of proximity and (since 2011) visa-free travel in
the EU to return, temporarily at least, perhaps before seeking work elsewhere while
4
When we first drafted this chapter and at least until April 2016, the Hellenic Statistical Authority’s emigration
estimations were also available on the EUROSTAT database for the years 2008-13 (Population and social
conditions: Emigration by sex, age group and citizenship,
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_emi1ctz&lang=en), including breakdown by
citizenship. Accordingly, during 2008-10 over half of emigrants were foreign nationals, while during 2011-13
Greek nationals form more than 50 per cent of those estimated to leave. At the time of revising the chapter (June
2016), this data was not any more available on the EUROSTAT database.
6
maintaining their residence in Greece (Gemi 2014). Similarly, ethnic Greek migrants from the
former Soviet Union may also seek work abroad as they have been doing before the crisis
(Pratsinakis 2013), while an invisible segment of the outflow concerns former Greek
emigrants and their children, who had in the meanwhile settled in Greece and now return
anew to their old host countries (Cavounides 2014). Pre-existing links, alongside “pull”
factors in terms of job demand and remuneration in specific sectors explain the persistence of
“traditional” post-war destinations, as suggested by recent studies: Australia (Tamis 2014),
the USA (Mihopoulos 2014), Canada (Konstandinidis 2014), or Germany (Georgiou et al.
2013; Damanakis 2014). Nevertheless, the range of destinations is highly diverse, spanning
from the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, or East Asia (Triandafyllidou/Gropas
2014; Labrianidis/Pratsinakis 2016). The majority, however, head to EU countries, with
Germany and the UK attracting approximately half of the outflows (Labrianidis/Pratsinakis
2016; see also Figure 15).
A recent study by Labrianidis and Pratsinakis (2016) conducted a nationwide representative
survey to 1237 households in Greece, gathering information for 248 emigrants. About one
third of them left Greece after 2010 while the rest had migrated in earlier decades, allowing
for three interesting observations of changes over time. Firstly, the emigrants’ average age
grows by emigration decade: from 24.3 years in the 1990s to 28.3 years in the 2000s and 30.5
years among post-2010 emigrants, while 11 per cent of the latter took the decision to migrate
in their forties. Secondly, the largest par of post-2010 emigrants (approximately two thirds)
comprises of people with university degrees, yet there is a considerable growth in the shares
of postgraduate degree holders and graduates of medical and engineering schools, while
significant proportions (approximately one third) have lower qualifications. In addition, there
seems to be a relationship between the emigrants’ educational background and their choice of
destination: e.g. the UK seems to attract primarily those with higher education, while
Germany and other former guest worker’s destinations such as the Netherlands attract also
people with middle or low skills. Thirdly, we see increased representation of lower income
groups, representing 28 per cent among post-2010 emigrants, which is almost the double in
comparison to their share during the previous decade.
5
Official statistics illustrated on Figure 1 show that, between 2010-2014, more than 141,000 Greek nationals
have registered with a local authority in Germany (including e.g. students and dependent family members), while
nearly 36,000 have received a National Insurance number in the UK (thus not including students or dependents).
7
The crisis thus not only feeds the resurgence of Greek emigration in terms of volume, but also
brings qualitative changes. A major transformation seems to be underway: migration is now
more a matter of need rather than one of choice. Even though the motivations of “crisis”
migrants are not limited to mere economic need but are rather framed in a wider context of
lack of prospects in the country, as well as positive evaluations of life and work abroad,
worsening conditions in the Greek labour market and concerns about employment and income
are primary motives for many.
At the same time, Labrianidis and Pratsinakis (2016) underline the difficulties of adaptation in
destination places. One out of five of their survey respondents were not able to find a job
within the first 6 months; a similar proportion were working bellow their qualifications and 6
per cent were unemployed, while some 15 per cent had already returned back to Greece.
Moreover, qualitative material from their study, in accordance to previous research (Georgiou
et al. 2013; Damanakis 2014b; Gropas/Triandafyllidou 2014), show that difficulties may be
more widespread6, with a considerable segment of the emigrants who have not secured
employment before emigration, including people of high educational backgrounds, ending up
in low-skilled jobs for significant periods before they manage to find jobs matching their
qualifications. In addition, although unrecorded in official statistics, the question of return is a
reality beyond vague hopes or even actual plans, sometimes linked to temporary migration
projects or subsequent mobility steps and livelihoods between “here” and “there”.
Dimensions of an emerging media discourse
Having outlined the broad picture and major trends of emigration from Greece at times of
crisis, we now move on to explore relevant media debates. Our review of news articles
reveals an emerging public discourse on new Greek emigration, which appears to be highly
selective, often emotional and largely politicised. We focused on content, examining key
themes, points of emphasis and perspectives, which allow us to broadly sketch the
development of Greek media debates. In out attempt to dig back in time, we have not come
across any articles on outmigration before 2010, and observed an exponential growth of news
coverage from just a few items in 2010 and 2011, to nine in 2012, 11 in 2013, 12 in 2014 and
6
The survey results should be treated with caution due to the methodology of Labrianidis’ and Pratsinakis’
(2016) survey, according to which it is primarily not the migrant her/himself providing the answer but another
member of the household, most commonly the parent. We may well assume that the emigrant paints a more
positive image of his/her situation to his/her parent, hence adaptation difficulties may actually be more common
as the qualitative data show.
8
23 in 2015. Most are mere news, reporting on latest statistics and figures, relevant studies and
surveys, or personal stories; some combine facts and opinion, while about 16 per cent are
commentaries. A general overview of the media reviewed and articles examined is given in
Table 1.
Labrianidis’ (2011) study has largely set the tone, monopolising early reports in 2010-11.
Soon after the publication of his book, he introduced a public debate entitled “Should I stay or
should I go in crisis-ridden Greece” on 6 June 2011 (organised by the international think tank
“intelligence squared”), which attracted considerable media attention focusing descriptively
on his main findings and arguments. Yet the deepening of the crisis, alongside escalating
emigration trends, seem to have inspired a direct association between his study and the
worsening conditions due to recession. Media reports on the book itself have been recurring
over the years as a reference point often complemented by new evidence, yet misleadingly
linking the findings to the crisis and ignoring that its empirical basis actually predated it. The
titles of such reports are indicative: “139,000 scientists out of Greece” (Imerisia 24.06.2011);
“New emigration wave: the Greeks, the crisis, and the routes of flight” (Ethnos, 28.01.2012).
Table 1. Overview of media articles reviewed
media type
1. Online versions of print newspapers (national range, general interest)
Kathimerini (9), To Vima (5), Ethnos (4), Avgi (2), Eleftherotypia (2), Real News (1)
23 (38.3%)
2. Online-only news media (general news)
TVXS (6), news247 (4), huffingtonpost (4), iefimerida (3), greekreporter (2) Greece
Tribune (1), protagon, i.gr (1), zougla.gr (1), newsit.gr (1), enikos (1), sky.gr (1)
26 (43.3%)
3. Online versions of special interest or local newspapers
Lifo (2), Imerisia (2), Ardin (2), Macedonia (1), Popaganda (1), Parallaximag (1),
7imeres (1), personal newsblog (1)
year of publication
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
article type
A. mere reportage
B. reportage, combined with or based on testimonies
C. opinion & analysis
11 (18.3%)
2 (3.3%)
3 (5.0%)
9 (15%)
11 (18.3%)
12 (20.0%)
23 (38.3%)
39 (65.0%)
11 (18.3%)
10 (16.7%)
9
Source: Authors’ own elaboration
A major theme has expectedly been that of rising unemployment affecting disproportionally
the young; the periodic updating of relevant statistics was often covered with reference to
emigration. Titles speak for themselves: “Unemployment banishes the young: almost half
Greeks of productive age look for work abroad” (in.gr, 19.12.2012); “Greece drives her
children away: youth unemployment at 58 per cent” (Macedonia, 09.01.2014). Even if the
link between unemployment and emigration is not a direct one, the case is made by
incorporating additional evidence deriving e.g. from opinion surveys on emigration
intensions, or trends in job searches or CVs uploaded on the EURES or Europass job portals.
Including questions about migration intensions has been a novelty in opinion polls
administered e.g. by market research companies or employment agencies. Although these are
often isolated questions and results do not necessarily correlate with other variables, they tend
to be overemphasised in the media, underlining intensions as reality rather than as an
indication of the general mood.
Emigration is thus primarily pictured as a brain drain, directed mostly to European
destinations, although their diversity is not ignored: “Greeks leave abroad for work: big
increases in the flow towards Britain, Germany, Norway and Belgium” (Tsakiri 2014);
“Which countries are Greek scientists-migrants heading to: brain drain” (TVXS, 19.10.2015).
However, specific countries and professions have attracted more publicity: about one out of
four of the articles reviewed focus on Germany. Reporting on official Destatis statistics on
recent immigration to the country, for instance, tend to emphasise information on Greeks:
“Record-high migration of graduates towards Germany: new wave” (TVXS, 18.01.2014).
Over 10 percent of news items are about doctors, mostly heading to Germany: “A flow of
Greek doctors, as Germans emigrate” (Kathimerini, 12. 12.2013); “More than 7000 Greek
doctors have left abroad due to the crisis” (Lifo, 21.12.2015).
The focus on Germany is no incidental: not only this is a major destination of new emigrants,
as it has been in post-war times, but it is also the country blamed for the harsh austerity
imposed on Greece as a condition for its bailout. Conditions there are occasionally depicted as
far from ideal, revealing cases of difficult adaptation or even exploitation in the labour
market, often by the older generation of former guest workers or by recruitment agencies:
“Greeks exploit Greeks in Germany” (Galanis 2012); “Shocking testimony of a Greek
migrant in Germany” (Dimou 2013); “Neomigrants are victims of exploitation” (Fotiadi
2014); “Berlin’s psychic clinics getting full of Greeks” (Ethnos, 28.10.2015).
10
Still, despite reporting on difficulties, mostly referring to the emigrants experiences in
Germany, the overall tendency is to prettify conditions abroad, especially by highlighting
successful individual cases of professionals “who made it”. Media articles are increasingly
informed by personal stories and migrants’ own insights, which feed the news alongside
official data and survey results. Sometimes these depict changes over time in individuals’
migration trajectories, or provide information for prospective migrants in specific countries or
sectors: “A young Greek doctor in Germany” (Lifo, 15.07.2013); “Looking for a job in
London” (protagon, 27.07.2014); “A Greek woman leaves abroad” (Stathopoulou 2015). In
such accounts, the option of leaving Greece is presented as a unidirectional and irreversible
path. It is only in 2015 that we first encounter articles on the issue of return, not simply
reporting on emigrants’ intensions, but also through direct accounts of people who have
already taken this step: “I have come back to Greece, but what for?” (Martinou 2015);
“Return in crisis-ridden Greece” (Papadopoulos 2015).
Emigration has thus reappeared as both a reality and a societal concern increasingly evident in
media discourses, a side effect of the crisis, recession and austerity. Its scale and volume have
become significant enough to inspire works of art and TV shows alike. We are aware of at
least three relevant theatre plays: one performed in 2013 (“Telemachus, or should I stay or
should I go”, featuring amateur actors who have been migrants themselves), and two in 2015
(“I want a country…”, “Kangaroo”). Moreover, the brain drain from the perspective of
emigrants has been the subject of numerous TV shows, including a documentary entitled “The
great escape” (focusing especially on ophthalmologists), screened on a national channel on 6
August 2015. Although media debates have to an extent been politicized since the early years,
emigration is increasingly depicted as a political issue, depending on different standpoints in
the media: the “migration of 200.000 young talented Greeks” is labeled a “crime” (Imerisia,
19.01.2015) and brain drain is pictured as a “slow-burning bomb” (Kambouris 2015). This
politicization also relates to the rise of emigration in policy agendas. Government change
since January 2015 signaled for the first time an interest in taking action, with the new Prime
Minister announcing a “long-term plan so that the thousands of young researchers currently
employed at universities and research centers abroad return to the country. This bleeding must
11
stop as it negatively affects the growth prospects of the Greek economy…”7. As in other
policy domains, this proved to be far from straightforward.
Concerns about the prospects of recovery of a country deprived of its young educated
workforce seem to give shape to a hegemonic discourse in which emigration appears as loss,
placing greater emphasis on its (negative) impact on the economy rather than on the lives of
the migrants themselves. Highlighting successful cases may be read as attempt to boost the
wounded national sentiment, forming hence the other pole in an ambivalent presentation of
emigration, which on the one hand laments the “bleeding” of the nation, while, on the other,
depicts it as an (easy) way out from a wrecked economy and a corrupt and inefficient state.
The outflow of immigrants is only scarcely mentioned, and in the few cases it does (e.g.
“Economic migrants fleeing Greece massively”; Tsiros 2014), it is described as an entirely
separate trend, while the emigration of older people, the lesser educated, or minority groups is
totally neglected. The diversity and complexity of outflows, their underlying structural roots,
as well as the motivations, aspirations, trajectories and experiences of emigrants remain thus
poorly understood. We next explore some of these, shifting our perspective towards an
emerging European destination.
Greek migration to the Netherlands at times of crisis
The sailors who found work in and around the Rotterdam harbor as peddlers and shipbrokers,
and the entrepreneurs who started cigarette factories or fur businesses in the early 20th century
were the forbearers of a more extensive Greek immigration to the Netherlands in postwar
times (Lindo 2000). In contrast to other nationalities, largely migrating in the framework of
bilateral agreements, the majority of Greek “guestworkers” arrived on their own initiative, or
by way of informal recruitment channels, mostly via Belgium and (less frequently) Germany
(Vermeulen et al. 1985). A bilateral agreement was eventually signed in 1966, just a year
before an economic downturn in the Netherlands and the coup d'état in Greece, therefore it
did not result in much recruitment (Lindo 2000). In the following years, immigration subsided
taking place mostly through family reunification. Free EU mobility for Greek citizens since
the 1980s triggered modest flows, including students and people from the Muslim minority of
7
Prime minister’s A. Tsipras speech, during the programmatic statements of the then newly-elected
Government, 08.02.2015, http://www.primeminister.gov.gr/english/2015/02/08/primeministers-a-tsipras-speechduring-the-programmatic-statements-of-the-government (accessed 20.03.2015).
12
Thrace, while a limited in scale emigration of professionals was underway already from the
late 1990s. By the late 2000s, the Greek population in the Netherlands counted approximately
13,900 people, showing modest annual increases in the previous 15 years, to a large extent
due to natural growth. Within five years since the outbreak of the crisis in Greece, the
registered population surged by almost 40 per cent, reaching 19,217 people in 2014. Taking
into account that several newcomers may not register, as indicated by our research, we may
estimate that the increase was significantly higher, considerably diversifying the established
Greek community in the country.
This section builds on qualitative material and survey data, in order to draw a comprehensive
picture of new Greek migration to the Netherlands. The survey was conducted by
Grammatikas as part of his involvement in the Greek community organization
“Neoafihthendes” (meaning “newcomers” in Greek). More specifically, a set of exploratory
key-informant interviews were initially conducted (Autumn 2013), which helped us
understand the broad picture and organise the survey which was administered during
December 2013 - February 2014. This was posted online on various relevant Facebook groups
and further disseminated via personal email lists and key figures of the community. It
deliberately targeted Muslims from Thrace, as an example of the migration of minority groups
(which should also include Albanians and “Soviet” Greeks), of whose presence we were
aware though they were not captured by the online survey. Their participation was achieved
in a series of meetings, organised with the help of their associations, to provide information
about life and work in the country. These gathered more than 120 people, 44 of whom filled
in the questionnaire face-to-face, making up a share of about 28 per cent among 158 total
respondents of the survey. Even though survey respondents were not selected via random
sampling, which would be in any case impossible given the lack of a sampling frame, we
actively tried to increase the diversity of the sample by recruiting respondents through a
variety of diversified entry points to increase representativeness. Comparing our results with
available official sources and through information we collected by systematically monitoring
social media webpages set up by newcomers, we were able to assess that they are largely
indicative of the trends within the new Greek emigrant population in the Netherlands, at least
with the exception of minority Muslims from Greece who were purposively sampled.
The qualitative material was collected through participant observation in the Greek
community house in Amsterdam, conducted by Pratsinakis as part of his ongoing IF Marie
Curie project EUMIGRE, as well as through his engagement with the same community
13
organization during November 2015 - June 2016. We also use material from 8 in-depth
interviews he conducted over this period in the context of the same project and three more
interviews the same author had contributed to the project "Outward Migration from Greece
during the Crisis" (Labrianidis/Pratsinakis 2006). On the basis of this diverse material, we
identified different categories of recent migrants from Greece to the Netherlands in terms of
their emigration patterns, the types of jobs they are doing, the degree to which those jobs
match their qualifications, their experiences of settling in, and the ways they frame their
experiences.
In agreement to the general trends earlier outlined, emigration to the Netherlands concerns
primarily, but not exclusively, educated young adults. Sixty six per cent of survey respondents
have tertiary education, while nearly half are between 20-30 years old, followed by more than
one third in their thirties. Yet, emigration is materialised following different mobility
strategies and settlement pathways. Several people, commonly with lower educational
backgrounds, emigrate for short-term periods as target earners. They work seasonally in
agriculture or horticulture aiming to contribute to the family income at home (as most
minority Muslims sdo), in small contracting projects or Greek tavernas, to respond to
immediate financial need or support themselves in wait of a job opening in Greece. Some may
also come for short periods, to inquire into employment possibilities and life conditions
through a first-hand experience of everyday life in the Netherlands. Many more arrive with
more permanent settlement intensions, often hosted by friends or relatives who are already
settled, after having collected enough information about life in the country but without having
found a job. Others apply for jobs from Greece, sometimes declaring the local address of
friends or kin in wait to be called for an interview, and some do secure employment in the
Netherlands before settling in the country. We next draw on a range of different individual
cases, as a step towards a typology of new Greek migration to the Netherlands.
Highly skilled migrants who have secured a job before arrival
Most of the emigrants who already have a job upon arrival do so in specific economic sectors
for which there are gaps and/or increased demand. Such gaps do not necessarily concern
chronic shortages and do change following labour market developments: for instance, a few
years ago one could rather easily find employment as a dentist even without considerable
working experience and without speaking Dutch, yet this is not possible anymore as the
14
dentists’ job market got saturated in the meantime. High-demand sectors include the nine socalled “topsectoren” prioritised by the Dutch State in its attempt to retain a leading position or
boost its competitiveness in the international market8. In these, there is global recruitment of
people with a background in technology, applied and life sciences for positions linked to
innovation, or for dynamic start-ups, in the context of the so-called global competition for
talent. A recent report (Ooijevaar et al. 2015) approximating the “expat” population in the
Netherlands counted 770 Greek-born employees matching this profile at the end of 20119;
despite its limitations, this gives an indication of their shares at about one tenth of Greeks in
the country: at the end of 2011 the registered Greek population counted 15,052 people, of
whom 7,483 were Greek-born and in working age. According to our survey, 23 per cent of
respondents fit in this category, with 18 per cent working for multinational companies or
international organizations. They are thus not a negligible segment of recent migrations.
For Greeks employed in such positions, emigration decisions are largely based on career
opportunity considerations, and location/city options are weighted in terms of valued quality
of life. They are also increasingly informed by perceptions about the lack of opportunities for
career advancement, for those who did have employment in Greece, and by experiencing
shrinking employment opportunities, for those who were unemployed. A rather separate
category concerns professionals sent to the Netherlands by their international companies.
Their emigration decisions are directly linked to the needs of their companies, which
commonly provide them with substantial help with settling in, and are framed within a
perspective attributing special value to international mobility for career advancement. Even if
the mobility of this category of people is the least typical case of crisis-driven migration and
actually predated the crisis, it is not always entirely unrelated as the case bellow suggests.
Tasos works for a big multinational company, and had just settled in Amsterdam when we
spoke in January 2016. He told us that gradually it had become clear to him that sooner or
later he would have to leave Greece if he was to keep (and advance) his position. It was the
lack of alternative employment options in Greece that made international mobility appear as a
necessity more than ever before, and led him eventually to take the decision to move. When
8
Those nine sectors are: 1) Agro & Food 2) Chemistry 3) Creative Industry 4) Energy 5) High Tech Systems
and materials 6) Life Sciences & Health 7) Logistics 8) Horticulture and Starting Materials 9) Water
9
The report counted foreign-born employees either working in hospitals and Universities or receiving high
salaries irrespectively of their sector of employment. The data exclude the self-employed, do not provide
information on the year of arrival and are rather out-dated given the growth of Greek emigration since 2012.
15
he learned about an opening in Amsterdam he found it an attractive opportunity and, together
with his wife, both in their early forties, they decided to emigrate. Tasos was concerned about
how migration will affect his everyday life and worried of the impact it will have on his
relationship. They had past experience of relocating in another city within Greece a few years
ago, which did not work out positively especially as his wife was not able to find employment
there. Despite his worries, however, he was excited about the experience of living abroad and
was convinced that being eager to pursue career opportunities is what people should be after
today. In his view, there always is labour demand, somewhere; one should be simply ready to
meet it by following developments and being where s/he is needed.
Migrants in search for employment
In this rather broad category, we encounter people whose decisions to emigrate are less
shaped by career considerations but primarily by a strong urge to escape crisis-ridden Greece
and are hence eager to hasten their emigration projects, including graduates whose skills are
not in much demand or people seeking work in sectors where recruitment does not take place
through online solicitations. Most migrants come to the Netherlands to enquire for work
opportunities with a certain amount of money ranging from a minimum of 2000 to a few
thousand euros. Many have difficulties in their way to find employment matching their
qualifications, and may end up in low-skilled jobs for considerable periods of time even if
they are highly educated. Language barriers may be one of the reasons why their labour
market integration proves to be difficult in practice, irrespectively of their skills. Among our
survey respondents, some 85 per cent considered that limited knowledge of Dutch poses
significant hindrances in everyday life and employment opportunities and claimed to be
willing to upgrade their language skills by undertaking language classes. Knowing people in
the Netherlands was reported to be equally important.
Yannis left Greece in late 2013 quitting his IT job, as he was heavily disappointed with the
situation in the country and felt insecure for the future, seeing “no potential for improvement
in the years to come”. He decided to move to Amsterdam where a good friend of his lived. It
took him six months to find his first job and another six months to find one in his field, living
in various temporary housing arrangements in the meantime. He told us he would not have
made it without his savings, since for a long period his earnings were well below his costs.
After a year in his new job Yannis got promoted and was offered a long term contract with a
16
good salary. He then rented out an independent apartment in Leiden, where he was joined by
his wife and newborn son. He currently sees no reason of returning, and he would rather avoid
re-migrating, at least in the short term, exhibiting a much less mobility-oriented attitude than
Tasos.
Kostas, a trained hematologist, chose to migrate to Amsterdam in 2012 because his aunt Rina
runs a restaurant there. He was hosted at her place and worked in her restaurant until he
earned enough money to rent his own flat. He then found a second job in a café nearby and a
few months later he was offered an annual contract in a museum restaurant. In the meantime,
he had been learning Dutch looking for jobs matching his credentials. A similar pathway was
earlier followed by Rina’s son-in-law Petros, an engineer. After 1.5 years working in several
restaurants in Amsterdam, Petros found a well-paid job in his field. It was taking longer for
Kostas to find such a job but he was not disappointed. Although he told us that things are
considerably more difficult in the Netherlands presently than in 2009, when Petros arrived,
Kostas was rather confident that sooner or later he would find a good job too. He was not
considering going back, as saw no chances of finding any work in Greece. In a follow up
conversation, he had indeed managed to find employment in a company in a field close to his
profession. He was happy with this development even though he confessed he did not expect
it would take him three years to meet this goal.
In many cases, people like Kostas prefer staying abroad over returning back even if they have
to work in low skilled jobs for prolonged periods of time. In Greece similar jobs are paid
much less and usually do not provide social security, while they are also associated with a low
social status. They thus stay abroad aiming to upgrade their language skills and build social
networks that will help them to eventually find better jobs. It is this promise for a brighter
future that keeps them abroad, even though there are also those who may decide to return.
According to official data (Ooijevaar 2015), approximately 20 per cent of the 2008-2010
arrivals left within a year. Even if a considerable part concerns students leaving the country
after completing their degrees, we may well assume that other cases are also included: people
who are disillusioned with their experience in the Netherlands or whose life circumstances
have changed, and may thus return to Greece or even emigrate instead to other destinations in
search for better employment opportunities or more attractive career prospects.
Students into migrants
17
Part of the “newcomers” are former students at Dutch Universities who overstay after
graduation. Some have come recently with that goal in mind, treating their studies as a first
step to materialise their emigration; others were already students before 2010 and, although
they were not originally planning to seek employment, as the crisis started deepening in
Greece they were confronted with the dilemma “to stay or return”. It should be generally
noted that student migration from Greece to the Netherlands has been on the increase in recent
years: students comprise about a quarter of annual arrivals, with more than 2000 Greeks
studying in the country at the moment10. Greeks are the sixth most populous nationality in
Dutch Universities and the third in postgraduate degree programmes, with 75 per cent of
Greek students enrolled for a Masters degree (Huberts 2015). As observed by Labrianidis and
Pratsinakis (2016), those who study social sciences and arts and humanities seem to
experience more difficulties in finding a job matching their background as compared to those
who have studied medicine, applied sciences or IT, which in some cases makes their mobility
and settlement projects rather ambivalent.
For instance, Aliki came to Amsterdam for postgraduate studies in the Social Sciences in
2014 and decided to stay. In the meantime, she found work in a cafeteria to support her living.
Due to her demanding work schedule eventually she could not keep pace with the
requirements of her studies. She thus decided to temporarily freeze her studies in order to
raise the funds to redo the program in the following year. Chrysa, on the other hand, came
with her boyfriend to follow an MA program in Political Science, but after her studies she
could not find employment matching her qualifications. Being unemployed for one year, she
decided to work voluntarily in an organisation which eventually hired her after eight months.
Yet, for others, the transition from studies to work turns out way beyond their aspirations,
leading them to reconsider their migration projects. One such case is Anna’s, who had
graduated from the same programme as Aliki and had also tried to stay in Amsterdam but did
not manage to find any job meeting her expectations. She returned to Greece only to leave
again within a few months, this time for Brussels. On the other hand, Achilleas, who studied
Social Sciences in Amsterdam, decided to prolong his stay working in a big international
hotel. After some time there, however, and having looked for job opportunities in his field, he
felt that he had no chance in getting any job matching his qualifications, mainly due to
10
Holland became an attractive destination for studies due to the good reputation of Dutch Universities, the large
number of study programs in English and, increasingly, the relatively low tuition fees, especially after the rise of
tuition in UK Universities.
18
insufficient language skills and lack of social networks. Fully absorbed by the work rhythms
of his hotel job, he felt that he was losing contact with his field of study. Although he was
paid a salary way above what he would be paid Greece, he decided not to renew his contract
and looked instead for a job related to his studies back home, even a low paid one. In a follow
up discussion, he had managed to find a job related to his field on a three-month renewable
contract, and was preparing his trip.
Migrants in precarious and exploitative conditions
A recent report (Booi et al. 2014, 24) unveiled that 18 per cent of the Greeks in Amsterdam
were found to live in the poverty line. This category includes those who are forced to live
with limited resources during their first steps in the country, as earlier recorded, but also
people who stagnate in conditions of precarious living. Moreover, some report exploitative
working conditions and discrimination in the labour market, particularly those working in
low-skilled manual jobs or in the hotel and catering sector (especially in Amsterdam). The
examples here draw on a diverse range of cases facing precarious and/or exploitative
conditions, temporarily or in the long run. They come from the experiences of people who
migrated at a later stage in their life course, the lesser educated, or minority groups.
The former case includes couples or even single parents emigrating in their late forties or
older, who seem to be driven by pressing financial need and/or concerns about their children’s
future. Some leave their children behind and support them by sending money back home;
others relocate together with their children aiming to build a life in the Netherlands which
they consider better for the future of their offspring. The choice of destination is often linked
to relatives living in the country, though this is not always the case. For instance, Eleni
arrived after selling off her property in Greece to buy a house in Heerlen, where she relocated
together with her (adult) son and daughter. They are currently making a living on her Greek
pension and by renting out one room of their apartment, while her son and daughter try to find
their way in the Dutch labour market which was the goal of their relocation.
Secondly, discrimination in the labour market may affect emigrants irrespective of their
qualifications and sectors of work, although it is reportedly much more common among those
with lower education attainments. More than half of the survey respondents reported
experiences of labour market discrimination and/or negative stereotyping. The latter was the
case especially in the early years of the crisis, when Greeks in the Netherlands were
19
stigmatized as lazy and corrupted, and were scapegoated “as if they were to be blamed for the
European Crisis”, in the words of a survey respondent. Other respondents referred to cases of
more direct discrimination, such as receiving lower wages than their Dutch counterparts, or
employers not recognizing their qualifications, etc.
Although broader stereotyping now seems to have lessen, some people we have talked to in
Amsterdam also reported exploitation in their work. Yorgos, for example, who does not have
university education, came to Amsterdam looking for work in 2012. He found a job in the
flower market but was very disillusioned from his emigration experience. His boss required
him to stand still throughout the day, which physically exhausted him. He earned about 1200
euros a month after taxes, the minimum wage in the Netherlands yet much higher than any
salary he ever had in Greece, but his living costs were much higher. Similarly to most
newcomers, he could not afford renting an apartment on his own but could only rent a room
for 400 euros. Elsa, on the other hand, a graduate in civil engineering, arrived as an intern in a
start-up company via the Erasmus exchange scheme. She complained about long working
days, way beyond those agreed in the contract, and a demand to perform activities that were
irrelevant to the subject of her internship. At the end of the contract she was asked to continue
working with a salary well below the minimum wage and for longer hours than is legally
acceptable in the Netherlands.
Notably, exploitation at work is also reported by those working for Greek employers.
Andreas, for example, who had worked in several Greek taverns, claimed that “he will never
work for Greeks in the Netherlands again”. We also recorded instances of blatant exploitation.
Such was the case of a group of people who were invited by a Netherlands-based Greek
employer to come for temporary work in a renovation project in Volendam. When they
finished their work, the employer had disappeared without having paid neither them, nor the
landlord of the apartment where they stayed.
Lastly, exploitation and precarious employment are widespread among minority Muslims
from Greece, as deriving from our survey results and the aforementioned meetings. Following
earlier migration patterns, most appear to be spatially concentrated mostly in Rotterdam, Den
Hague, but also Leeuwarden, where they are organised around local associations. According
to estimations by community leaders more than 1000 people live in the Netherlands, a large
share of whom have not registered their stay in the country. This is because they may not be
aware of this requirement, or because they are unable to do so, or finally because they
deliberately choose not to. In addition to settled migrants, a considerable number of minority
20
Muslims are coming and going on a seasonal basis. According to survey results, minority
Muslims are on average older than most recent migrants from Greece and a large segment (40
per cent) has only primary education. They almost exclusively work in low status - low paid
jobs, mostly in greenhouses, slaughterhouses and construction. One out of four does not have
health insurance, as most work on hourly-paid contracts, while some are asked to register as
free lancers and then given a zero hour contract so that employers do not have to pay for
social and health contributions. Almost none speaks Dutch or English and many neither speak
Greek, which is why many are dependent not only on their mostly Turkish-Dutch employers
and employment brokers through whom they find work, but also from “accountants” as they
call the people who do their paperwork charging them very high fees.
Concluding remarks
Some of the difficulties experienced by new migrants to the Netherlands as in most cases
outlined above could perhaps have been smoother, if community structures and host society
institutions were in place to support and provide orientation to newcomers. Although for
minority Muslims community associations still play an important social role (even though this
does seem to protect them against exploitative conditions and precarious living), this is not
the case for most other recent migrants from Greece. The purpose and functions of
community organizations set up by Greek immigrants of earlier decades have long faded
away, while changes in Dutch integration policies have meanwhile led to decreasing
(financial) support, depriving those surviving from the capacity to sustain a meeting place.
Increasing arrivals of mostly younger migrants from Greece in recent years found hence no
community infrastructure where they could seek information and support, while the image of
existing associations as old-fashioned clubs for elderly “guestworkers” makes contact
problematic.
We are aware of just one organization with a meeting place in Amsterdam that a group of
recent migrants try to transform into a center for newcomers, as well as of a number of
initiatives aiming at specific purposes (news-gathering, organizing parties, a student society, a
network for psychological support). But the range and scope of these initiatives is fairly
limited, and most new migrants lean on family and friends/acquaintances, or even employers
for basic information and help. The main attempts towards some sort of community
networking are to be found on the internet with various Facebook groups mushrooming in
21
recent years, on which newcomers share experiences and seek information on an impressive
range of topics (from the criteria to receive unemployment benefit or finding a room to stay,
to selling a sofa or sending a package to Greece); yet these seem to rest on the shoulders of a
handful of people. Although the basic information a newcomer needs to know about life and
work in the Netherlands can be found digitally quite easy, sometimes in Greek or at least in
English, more detailed information can be only found in Dutch. Considering that most
newcomers do not master the language, much of the information circulated in informal social
and digital networks is not always reliable, and often generate situations of misinformation,
indistinctness and confusion. Hence, as other EU migrants, recent arrivals from Greece make
use of their basic right of free movement within the EU but are left in the dark about their
rights and duties in the host country. The withdrawal of the state from providing minimum
support shifts the responsibility for integration to the migrants themselves, and rests on the
assumption that EU migrants do not have particular difficulties in their adaption pathways.
Of the multiplicity of individual pathways and migration experiences we have encountered,
we hereby chose to highlight aspects that problematize idealistic perceptions of life and work
“in Europe” often depicted in Greek media. Not only have we showed how adaptation to a
new life abroad is not as straightforward, but we also accounted for neglected components of
contemporary outflows, including people in need from a diverse range of socio-economic,
educational and ethnic backgrounds. By highlighting difficulties, we do not intend to overlook
the many positive experiences of Greeks in the Netherlands or other EU countries (and
beyond), but rather to deconstruct conventional assumptions of emigration as a monolithic
project and lifetime decision, of ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ as definite outcomes, of the
youngest and brightest who are valued abroad but are doomed at home. People like those we
have talked to in Amsterdam may be ‘pioneers of European integration’ in that they promote
it in practice from bellow (Favell and Recchi 2009), yet they are at the same time product of
its present-day shortcomings.
The Greek crisis has amplified pre-existing mobility patterns of young graduates, but also
impacted on the mobility practices of people of other socio-economic backgrounds.
Emigration turns into a survival strategy for many who are finding it hard to make ends meet,
while, at the same time, it emerges as an increasingly appealing option for others in less
pressing need who see their career potentials critically reduced. Outflows since 2009 appear to
be comparable in size with those of post-war decades, but they take place alongside ongoing
immigration to or through Greece. Moreover, there are significant differences in the socio22
economic, educational and demographic profiles of today’s “crisis” migrants, while the
macro-structural causes triggering emigration at present are radically different, as is its
context and infrastructure. New migrants are not supported by state institutions and migration
trajectories are shaped by their socio-economic background and social capital. People
specialized in fields for which there is high demand can easily secure employment abroad in
many cases even before they actually emigrate. People with lower education or skills that is
not valued in the labour market of their destinations find it more difficult to find employment
that matches their qualifications, as do those with poor language skills and lack of social
networks. On the other hand, free movement within the EU makes emigration an easier
mobility strategy to pursue, reducing its economic and psychological costs. Emigration is no
longer seen as a once-in-a-life-time decision, as people increasingly move spontaneously and
provisionally, looking for potential opportunities mostly in Northern Europe. This not only
suggests the multiplicity of mobility pathways, but also the open and dynamic character of
migration projects and processes, rather than simply the relocation from one place to another.
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